The National Abortion Federation opposes the re-nomination of Texas Supreme Court Associate Justice Priscilla Owen to the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, which serves Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. Justice Owen's record demonstrates a profound lack of judicial restraint, and the Senate recognized this in refusing to confirm her when she was nominated in 2002. Her judicial activism makes her an inappropriate candidate for the Fifth Circuit, often the court of last resort for those in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi seeking to protect their constitutional rights.
The National Abortion Federation opposes the re-nomination of Texas Supreme Court Associate Justice Priscilla Owen to the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, which serves Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi. Justice Owen's record demonstrates a profound lack of judicial restraint, and the Senate recognized this in refusing to confirm her when she was nominated in 2002. Her judicial activism makes her an inappropriate candidate for the Fifth Circuit, often the court of last resort for those in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi seeking to protect their constitutional rights.
During her service on the Texas Supreme Court, Owen has shown a consistent and extreme conservative bias, focused most strongly on young women seeking abortion care. Owen's lack of impartiality is troubling on its face. The extent to which she has abused her powerful position, often disregarding the rule of law and misrepresenting statutory text, court precedent, and legislative intent to justify her biased rulings, leads us to seriously question her fitness for a lifetime appointment to the Fifth Circuit. Our opposition is based on the following:
- Owen has been accused of unconscionable judicial activism even by her own conservative colleagues on the bench (including Alberto Gonzales, who is now United States Attorney General).
- In abortion cases coming before the Texas Supreme Court, she has voted against abortion rights, often disregarding established precedent, rewriting legislative intent, and speaking disparagingly of abortion providers and women who choose abortion. These cases demonstrate her considerable bias and inability to employ judicial restraint.
- In such parental notification cases, Owen has attempted to impose unconstitutional religious requirements on minors, and has refused to objectively consider such serious factors as abuse, parental disownment, and medical risks. Instead, Owen has explicitly refused to abide by the rule of law in regard to the Texas parental notification statute's judicial bypass provision, which she dismisses as unsanctioned "deceit" of parents which the legislature "surely" could not have intended.
For these reasons, the National Abortion Federation concludes that Priscilla Owen lacks the appropriate and necessary judicial restraint and impartiality required for a federal appellate judge
Justice Owen Has a Well Known Conservative Bias, Even in Comparison with and According to Other Conservatives.
- She is "considered by legal analysts in Texas to be among the most conservative members of the Texas Supreme Court, which, in turn, is considered one of the nation's most conservative supreme courts."1
- Justice Owen's extreme judicial activism has even been criticized by other conservatives. After Owen wrote a particularly inflammatory dissent in a parental notification case, attempting to legislate from the bench and impose religious and other strict criteria upon judicial bypass cases, Bush's own White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales (who was then Owen's colleague on the Texas Supreme Court) described the dissenters' narrow construction of the statute as "an unconscionable act of judicial activism."2
Justice Owen's Bias Against a Woman's Right to Choose Abortion Rises to the Level of Judicial Activism.
- Justice Owen has consistently voted against a woman's right to choose abortion during her tenure on the Texas Supreme Court. In every opinion authored by Owen in abortion cases, she has ruled against abortion rights, often disregarding established precedent in the process, rewriting legislative intent, speaking derogatorily of abortion providers and women who choose abortion, and otherwise displaying an egregious lack of impartiality and judicial restraint.
- In Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas,3 Owen displayed unwillingness to protect abortion clinics from harassing protesters, voting instead to eliminate and narrow buffer zones which protected doctors, patients, and clinic escorts from protesters who were obstructing access to Houston-area clinics, lifting an injunction issued by a trial court to protect clinics against such harassment.
- Justice Owen voted against abortion rights in fourteen out of sixteen abortion cases4 decided by the Texas Supreme Court as of the writing of this report.5 In parental notification judicial bypass cases specifically, the only case in which Owen did not vote to deny a girl her right to have an abortion without parental notification was a 2002 case6 decided after Owen was nominated to the 5th Circuit.
The remainder of this report examines Justice Owen's decisions in parental notification judicial bypass cases in more detail.
In the first parental notification judicial bypass case decided by the Texas Supreme Court following the legislative enactment of the Parental Notification Act, In re Jane Doe I,7 Justice Owen attempted to create a state-mandated religious counseling requirement for pregnant teens; insisted that the legislative intent behind the judicial bypass exception to the parental notification requirement should have been to stop, not allow, abortions; contended that Planned Parenthood was not a "qualified source" of medical information; and tried to delay a girl's abortion past the 14-week first trimester abortion point.8 She was consequently reprimanded by the majority for her inflammatory rhetoric and failure to adhere to the rule of law.
The first Jane Doe case was heard by the Texas Supreme Court on two separate occasions. In her first dissent, Owen misrepresented the legislative intent of the Texas Legislature in creating the abortion bypass statute. While the parental notification statute is unquestionably a restriction on a minor's access to abortion, Owen espoused her view that the legislative intent behind the bypass exception to parental notification as well must have been to limit access to abortion.9 The majority rejected Owen's misrepresentation that the legislature intended to make a judicial bypass something difficult to obtain and rarely granted.10 Responding to Owen's dissent, the majority of the court chastised judges such as Owen and the lower court judges for failing to "put aside our personal viewpoints and endeavor[...] to do our job as judges - that is, to interpret and apply the Legislature's will as it has been expressed in the statute."11
The majority's response to Owen's attempt to redefine the legislature's intent, signed onto by Justice Gonzales, continued:
The United States Supreme Court has observed that abortion is a divisive and highly charged issue. Thus, we recognize that judges' personal views may inspire inflammatory and irresponsible rhetoric. Nevertheless, the issue's highly-charged nature does not excuse judges who impose their own personal convictions into what must be a strictly legal inquiry. . . As judges, we cannot ignore the statute or the record before us. Whatever our personal feelings may be, we must "respect the rule of law."12 [emphasis added]
In his separate concurrence, Justice Gonzales similarly rebuked Owen and the other dissenter for suggesting that the Texas Legislature's intent was to make the granting of bypasses rare:
...to construe the Parental Notification Act so narrowly as to eliminate bypasses, or to create hurdles that simply are not to be found in the words of the statute, would be an unconscionable act of judicial activism.13 [emphasis added]
It is highly unusual for the conservative justices on a state supreme court to condemn one of their own so strongly for refusing to follow the rule of law. As such, this unusual action from the Texas Supreme Court (not a liberal or pro-choice court by anyone's count) demonstrates that Owen's persistently polemic and irresponsible refusal to recognize the rights of young women to obtain abortions through the judicial bypass system can fairly be called "unconscionable judicial activism."
Owen Misrepresents Legislative Intent of Bypass Provision: "Stop All Abortions"
As described above, one of the biggest sources of disagreement in Jane Doe I between Owen and her colleague resulted from her creative reading of legislative intent.
In Jane Doe 1, Owen did not hide her apparent desire to use her judicial powers to prevent abortions. In her dissent, she expressed disagreement with the standards set by the majority of the court, writing "the Court's interpretation of 'sufficiently well informed' falls short of what the Legislature had in mind [because] [m]ost minors will, with the assistance of counsel, be able to meet the requirements set by the Court. . . ."14 This statement is an inaccurate portrayal of the statute's purpose and reflects Owen's inappropriate agenda of rewriting legislative intent, falsely describing the bypass statute as being designed to prevent, not assist, minors, in their attempt to obtain abortions free from parental abuse and other harms.
In re Jane Doe 2,15 a case involving, in part, the interpretation of "best interest," Owen's opinion was similarly based on her subjective biases rather than on the rule of law, and created fictitious legislative intent where there was no such intent in the record.
As the majority explained in Jane Doe 2, the only best interest determination required by Texas Family Code 33.003 is that "[i]f the court finds that the minor is mature and sufficiently well informed, that notification would not be in the minor's best interest, or that notification may lead to physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the minor, the court shall [allow a bypass]."16 [emphasis added]
However, Justice Owen disregarded the plain language of the statute, as well as its clear legislative intent, and took it upon herself once again to superimpose her subjective opinion about what she thought the legislative intent should have been, writing that young women should also be required to jump through yet another hurdle to prove that having an abortion is in their best interest:
The Court has failed to give effect to the Legislature's intent regarding the "best interest" prong of section 33.003(i) of the Family Code . . . The Court has omitted any requirement that a trial court find an abortion to be in the best interest of the minor . . . Surely the Legislature did not intend for a minor to proceed with an abortion under the "best interest" aspect of section 33.003 when there has been no informed determination by a parent, a court, or the minor herself that the abortion is in her best interest.17
This portion of Owen's concurrence in Jane Doe 2 is striking in its blatant misportrayal of the Texas Statute, which nowhere requires that a minor establish that an abortion is in her best interest, a far more difficult hurdle for minors to overcome than the actual requirement of showing that notification is against the girl's best interest. Owen's eagerness to misrepresent both the text of a statute as well as the legislative intent (stating only that "surely" her subjective views must be what the Legislature intended, without any evidence on the record to back up her assertion) is yet another example of how capriciously Justice Owen substitutes her own beliefs for the policy decisions of law-making bodies.
Owen Redefines "Maturity" As Not Seeking Judicial Bypass at All, Thwarting Meaning Of Statute and Creating Impossible Hurdle
In her Jane Doe 1 dissent, Owen went beyond merely rewriting the statute's legislative intent, and reconstructed the meaning and standards of the statute itself.
Among other matters raised by Owen's dissent in that case was the issue of Jane Doe's maturity. Despite the evidence of Jane Doe's ability to withstand hours of questioning and months of court processes on top of her senior year high school work, part time job, and college preparation, and despite Jane Doe's concern that her anti-abortion parents (who were still supporting her as most parents support their children) would cut her off if they knew about her pregnancy, Justice Owen declared the girl too immature to be allowed an abortion, writing:
This is some evidence that Doe is not mature enough to accept responsibility for her actions or her future. She intends to continue to seek and take support from her parents in virtually all aspects of her life, but not with regard to her decision to have an abortion.
By imposing such standards based on a subjective bias against abortion rather than through the objective logic of reasoned jurisprudence, Owen threatens to deny litigants any semblance of a reasonable appellate process. By assuming that a girl's very participation in the statutory bypass process is evidence of immaturity, Owen creates an impossible standard. Minors seeking to establish they are mature enough to be granted a judicial bypass cannot in fairness be labeled "immature" for seeking the bypass exception to parental notification in the first place. Owen's standard defies both logic and the plain text of the statute.
Owen Equates the Seeking of a Bypass with "Deceit," and Explicitly Rejects the Rule of Law
Yet another example of Justice Owen's lack of judicial restraint can be found in the case In re Jane Doe 4.18 In Jane Doe 4, Justice Owen again dissented with the majority's remand of the case back to trial court for further determination of whether the girl in that case was mature and well-informed enough to be allowed an abortion without parental notification. The majority ruled that the girl seeking the judicial bypass should be allowed to present the facts under the new standards recently articulated by the Texas Supreme Court. Justice Owen, however, argued that the girl should not have the opportunity to present testimony which might satisfy the changes in the law since her first hearing.
The 17-year-old girl in Jane Doe 4 testified that her parents had kicked her older sister out of the house and cut off all contact with her under similar circumstances, and that Doe believed her parents would react the same way with her.19
The Court in previous parental notification cases had set forth as a factor to evaluate in "best interest" determinations whether and how notification would affect the relationship between a girl and her parents. Consequently, the majority in Jane Doe 4 explained that "not only did [Jane Doe's] parents banish her sister from their home, but they have not spoken to her ever since. This type of potential disruption to Doe's family relationship may weigh against notifying her parents."20
However, Justice Owen's dissent disregarded this required element of best interest determinations, writing that
. . . neither the trial court nor this Court may properly consider whether Jane Doe 4's parents would withdraw their emotional or financial support after she turns eighteen and graduates from high school if they were notified of her intent to have an abortion while she is a minor . . . I cannot countenance a rule of law that would permit a minor to deceive her parents in order to avoid their expression of disapproval....21
It is clear from this strong language that Justice Owen has sought to abrogate the role of the court to weigh such important factors as the parent-child relationship in making "best interest" determinations. In doing so, she ignored the standards set by the Texas legislature, stating that the statute's judicial bypass process is no better than "deceit," an exceedingly inappropriate way for a state supreme court justice to describe her own state's laws.
Most disturbing in Justice Owen's unorthodox style of jurisprudence is her explicit refusal to adhere to the rule of law when it does not suit her personal views. Justice Owen's own stated refusal to adhere to the rule of law should not be taken lightly by those weighing her qualifications to serve the 5th Circuit as a fair and unbiased jurist who is obligated under oath to follow the rule of law despite her personal prejudices.
Another source of disagreement between Justice Owen and her colleagues in Jane Doe 1 resulted from the majority's agreement to grant of an expedited hearing for Jane Doe after the case had already been delayed a month.
After correcting Owen's inaccurate representation of the Texas Legislature's intent in enacting a judicial bypass exception to the parental notification statute, the majority moved on to address Owen's unfair criticism of their decision to expedite the case. While the case was being remanded and appealed back and forth, the majority explained, Jane Doe had had her abortion delayed over a month and by the date of the March 10, 2000 opinion, was facing the final date at which the safest form of abortion, a suction curettage, could be performed.22
While the majority sympathized with the resulting medical difficulties faced by Jane Doe as a result of the slow court process and consequently expedited the next hearing, dissenting Justice Owen vehemently expressed her displeasure with the majority's recognition of the delay's serious repercussions for the pregnant girl, and with their willingness to speed up the process to avoid delaying Doe's procedure any further.23
Owen's dissent in Jane Doe reflects a troubling desire by the judge to greatly delay Jane Doe's abortion, which would, as the majority found, increase the medical risks to the girl and result in the need for a more complicated second trimester procedure.
Owen's lack of empathy for the health of young women seeking judicial bypasses facing health risks is further evidenced in a later parental notification case, In re Jane Doe 4(II)24. In the concurrence signed in Jane Doe 4(II) by Owen and another justice, Owen disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Jane Doe's testimony about a medical condition did not sufficiently establish a need for a judicial bypass:
. . . the deficit in Doe's testimony is that on the whole . . . it shows no depth of understanding that a minor should be expected to have before making the "grave and indelible" decision to have an abortion. Presumably the Court would conclude that Doe had established her right to a judicial bypass if only she had been a little more specific about the risks in having an abortion posed by the prior treatment for her medical condition. This trivializes both the abortion decision and the exclusion of Doe's parents from that decision.25
This passage, reflecting Owen's apparent stance that even health risks should not be taken as seriously by the courts as her own personal bias against allowing minors abortions, is one of the most disturbing pieces of evidence of Owen's lack of judicial restraint and impartiality.
Owen's position that even a girl's medical condition is not a valid "best interest" consideration is troubling both on legal grounds - once again reflecting a disregard for established standards of law - as well as for its life-threatening implications for plaintiffs whose lives and rights are in the hands of Justice Owen.
By accusing those who bring legitimate and serious health concerns to the court of "trivializing" the abortion decision, Owen and her conservative colleague themselves trivialize the lives of women in their court as well as the established rule of law itself. Such unbridled bias and lack of judicial restraint is inappropriate in any court.
In the judicial bypass case In re Jane Doe 2,26 Justice Owen, concurring in part with the majority (which remanded the case), displayed a shocking lack of sympathy toward the teenaged girl seeking refuge from potential abuse through the judicial bypass system.
In re Jane Doe 2 involved a teenaged girl who was afraid to notify her parents of her pregnancy in part because of her father's temper. Her father had gotten so angry at her in the past that he had hit her. Jane Doe testified of her father that ". . . he's hit me. He has a - he has just like slapped me and he has a temper and he might . . . kick me out of the house."27
Despite such testimony of abuse, Owen held that Jane Doe failed to establish that notifying her parents of the pregnancy could lead to physical or emotional abuse.28
Owen again displayed a lack of compassion for victims of abuse in a later decision, In re Jane Doe 3.29 In Jane Doe 3, Owen again dissented from the majority, which remanded the case on the issue of whether Jane Doe in that case had sufficiently established potential emotional abuse by her parents. Despite the fact that Jane Doe had been subjected to drunken rages by her father in which her father would physically abuse her mother in front of her when angry at something Jane Doe had done,30 Owen found that such drunken rages constituted acceptable discipline rather than emotional abuse, writing:
A parent must have wide latitude to exert influence over and to discipline a child. Often, influence or discipline is intended to and does cause emotional distress. But, emotional distress of that nature cannot be the basis for denying a parent information as basic as the fact that his or her child is pregnant and intends to have an abortion.31
In Jane Doe I, Justice Owen voted to deny a young woman just shy of her eighteenth birthday her request for a judicial bypass, writing that the young woman was not well enough informed about her options, despite the fact the girl had received information from friends, family, a parenting teacher, and Planned Parenthood. Legislating her conservatism from the bench, Owen voted to impose an unconstitutional religion-based requirement upon minors that had not been approved by the Texas Legislature, writing that before recognizing the right to an abortion in judicial bypass cases:
I would require a minor to demonstrate that she has sought and obtained meaningful counseling from a qualified source about the emotional and psychological impact she may experience now and later in her life as a result of having an abortion. She should be able to demonstrate to a court that she understands that some women have experienced severe remorse and regret. She should also indicate to the court that she is aware of and has considered that there are philosophic, social, moral, and religious arguments that can be brought to bear when considering abortion. . . [R]equiring a minor to exhibit an awareness that there are issues, including religious ones, surrounding the abortion decision is not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.32
The minor in Jane Doe 1 had consulted with numerous individuals who had described having abortions without negative complications, had obtained information from a parenting teacher at her school, and had received counseling and medical information about the abortion procedure and adoption information from Planned Parenthood. Nonetheless, Owen wrote that Jane Doe clearly was not "well-informed" enough about abortion to be allowed one because Doe had concluded that abortion was not traumatic, writing, "[s]he expressed no appreciation that many women experience emotional and psychological problems as a consequence of their decisions or why that is so."33
Owen concluded that Doe failed to meet Owen's unilaterally imposed requirement that a minor must
. . . demonstrate that she has sought and obtained meaningful counseling from a qualified source about the emotional and psychological impact she may experience now and later in her life as a result of having an abortion. She should be able to demonstrate to a court that she understands that some women have experienced severe remorse and regret.34
Implicit in her opinion was Owen's accusation that Planned Parenthood is not a professional enough health care facility to be considered a "qualified source" of information, concluding that Jane Doe, who received counseling and information from Planned Parenthood (a health care facility licensed by the state of Texas), hadn't received "in-depth counseling and information from sources qualified by training and experience."35
Owen's conclusion that only those who subject themselves to anti-abortion activists' condemnation of abortion are "well-informed" is clear as well in Owen's later dissent:
. . . the record indicates that Doe did not seek advice or counseling from anyone who was inclined to thoroughly explore with her the adverse emotional and psychological impact that an abortion may have. Doe affirmatively avoided counseling from any source who might cause her to seriously examine her decision in a meaningful way . . .36
The implication that the accurate and unbiased information provided to Jane Doe by Planned Parenthood, her friends and family, and the parenting teacher at her school was not "meaningful" and did not come from "qualified sources," as compared to the often scientifically and medically inaccurate literature of anti-abortion activists, again displays a disturbing lack of impartiality.
Due to Owen's extreme bias against reproductive freedom, and more troubling, the extent to which she is willing to engage in judicial activism and disregard the rule of law to achieve the subjective results she desires, Justice Priscilla Owen does not possess the appropriate and necessary judicial restraint and impartiality required for a federal appellate judge.
* NAF's report on Priscilla Owen was originally written in the spring of 2002, during the Senate Judiciary Committee's first consideration of her nomination. Since NAF's report opposing the nomination of Priscilla Owen was released last spring, there have been two additional abortion related cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court and including the vote of Owen, and the report has been updated to include those cases. The Court decided one additional "Jane Doe" parental involvement case, In re Jane Doe 11, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 168, in which Owen signed onto a per curiam opinion denying appeal on procedural, rather than substantive grounds.
The other opinion, Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, 46 Tex. Sup. J. 3098 (2002), was a significant blow for low-income women in Texas seeking the right to Medicaid funding for abortions in the case of medical necessity. In Bell, the Texas Court of Appeals had ruled that under Texas' Equal Rights Amendment, the state must fund abortions for poor women more expansively than under Federal Medicaid. Low Income Women of Texas v. Bost, 38 S.W.3d 689. However, on appeal, Owen signed on with the majority, voting to deny women federal funding for abortions for health related reasons unless the pregnancy was the results of rape, incest, or was life threatening.
- Jim Yardley, "Enron Ruling By Nominee To U.S. Court Is Being Noticed," New York Times 1/22/02. See also David Jackson, "Texan among Bush's likely judicial picks; Partisan battle brewing over nominations," Dallas Morning News, 5/9/01 (""She has played a role as a conservative on the court," said Frank Newton, dean of the law school at Texas Tech University").
- In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 366 (Tex. 2000)(Gonzales, J., concurring). See also, Stuart Taylor, Jr., "More Judicial Mud Fighting," Legal Times, May 13, 2002.
- 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998)
- The bypass cases involve Texas' Parental Notification Act, which allows minors to have abortions without parental notification if the girl is mature and sufficiently well-informed to have an abortion without parental notification; if notification isn't in her best interest; or if notification may lead to physical, sexual or emotional abuse. Tex. Family Code § 33.001 et seq.
- The judicial bypass cases involved ten separate plaintiffs, Jane Doe "1" through "10," and twelve separate decisions, In re Jane Doe 1(I), 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000); In re Jane Doe 1(II),19 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. 2000); In re Jane Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000); In re Jane Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2000); In re Jane Doe 4(I), 19 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2000); In re Jane Doe 4(II), 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000) (second appeal of Jane Doe 4), In re Jane Doe 10, 45 Tex. Sup. J. 605 (Tex. 2002). In In re Jane Doe 5-9, the Court denied bypass to the minor litigants without written opinions. The other two abortion cases ruled on by Owen as a Texas Supreme Court Justice were Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Tex, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998) (the abovementioned buffer zone case) and Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. 1996) (Owen voted with majority to deny claim of police officer injured by protesters at abortion clinic, agreeing with the majority that "the whole purpose of [anti-abortion protesters] defendants' non-violent resistance was to prevent anyone from being harmed").
- In re Jane Doe 10, 45 Tex. Sup. J. 605 (Tex. 2002).
- 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000), 19 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. 2000)
- Id. See also following sections, infra.
- 19 S.W.3d at 260. See also next section, "Owen Misrepresents Legislative Intent Of Bypass Provision: 'Stop All Abortions!'"
- 19 S.W.3d at 353.
- Id. at 350.
- Id. at 355-356, citing Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866, 868-869 (1992).
- 19 S.W.3d at 366 (Gonzales, J., concurring).
- 19 S.W.3d at 260.
- 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000)
- Tex. Fam. Code 33.003(i).
- 19 S.W.3d 346, 381 (Tex. 2000)(Owen, J., dissenting).
- 19 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. 2000), 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000)
- 19 S.W.3d 322 at 326.
- Id. at 340
- Id. at 335.
- Id. at 345-346.
- Id. at 376 -383 (emphasis added).
- In re Jane Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2000)
- Id. at 342 (Hecht, J., Owen, J. concurring)
- 19 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 2000)
- Id. at 287.
- Id. at 288.
- In re Jane Doe 3, 19 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2000)
- Id. at 308 (Enoch, J., concurring and dissenting)
- Id. at 320 (Owen, J., dissenting)
- In re Jane Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 264-265 (Owen, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
- Id. at 266.
- In re Jane Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 264(Owen, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
- In re Jane Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d at 266, 269.
- In re Doe 1, 19 S.W.3d 346, 383 (Owen, J., dissenting).
|
